HIMALAYA, the Journal of the
Association for Nepal and
Himalayan Studies
Volume 23
Number 1 Himalaya; The Journal of the
Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies

Article 10

2003

Centralizing Politics and the Growth of the Maoist Insurgency in
Nepal
Mahendra Lawoti
Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya

Recommended Citation
Lawoti, Mahendra. 2003. Centralizing Politics and the Growth of the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal.
HIMALAYA 23(1).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya/vol23/iss1/10

This Research Article is brought to you for free and open access by the DigitalCommons@Macalester College at
DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has been accepted for inclusion in HIMALAYA, the Journal of the Association
for Nepal and Himalayan Studies by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more
information, please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.

MAHENDRA LAWOTI

WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY, KALAMAZOO

CENTRALI ZING POLITICS AN D THE GROWTH OF THE
MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL

1

This article argues that the over centralization of politics in Nepal contributed in the initiation
and the growth of the Maoist insurgency. The centralized unitary state structure, hegemonic
executive, powerful political parties and dominant leaders, and ethnic centralization led to extreme power concentration in the cabinet, which was controlled by a small group of political elite
hailing from the dominant group (male Chettri-Bahun) . The over centralization of state power
and centralizing political culture fostered widespread power abuse and corruption, undermined
accountability, caused neglect and underdevelopment of periphery, alienated minorities, and
squandered opportunities to form coalition among mainstream political forces to resist the Maoists.
The repression and exclusion pushed the Maoists into the insurgency, the absence of state agencies in the rural regions made it easy for the l\hoist to operate, and the alienated people provided
the support base for growth of the insurgency. This article argues that the over centralization
of politics in Nepal contributed in the initiation and the growth of the Maoist insurgency. The
centralized unitary state structure, hegemonic executive, powerfu l political parties and dominant
leaders, and ethnic centralization led to extreme power concentration in the cabinet, which was
controlled by a small group of political elite hailing from the dominant group (male Chettri-Bahun). The over centralization of state power and centralizing political culture fostered widespread
power abuse and corruption, undermined accountability, caused neglect and underdevelopment
of periphery, alienated minorities, and squandered opportun ities to form coalition among mainstream political forces to resist the Maoists. The repression and exclusion pushed the Maoists
into the insurgency, the absence of state agencies in the rural regions made it easy for the Maoist to operate, and the alienated people provided the support base for growth of the insurgency.

INTRODUCTION

Scholars and other commentators have cited a variety of explanations for the Maoist insurrection in
Nepal, from ideological and personal power struggles within Marxist political parties, to failed development programs, to structural inequities favoring
high castes (Lawoti 200lc; Shah 2001; Bhurtel 2002;
Maharjan 2000; Neupane 2001; Shneiderman and
Turin 2004; Gellner 2003; Bhattachan 2000a; de
Sales 2003; Thapa 2001). No one, however, has yet
analyzed how the formal and informal structure of
the Nepali State has affected the growth of the insurgency. To fill this void and add to our understanding
of Nepal's fratricidal war, I will explore the structure
of the state and factors that affect it in this paper.
First, I describe the ways the constitution of the
"democracy" period (1990-2002) created a highly
centralized state, with power concentrated in the executive (cabinet) and a small group of political actors.
Second, I show how this centralized politics led to

power abuse, rampant corruption, non-performance
of duties by government workers, and alienation
of the citizenry-all of which contributed to the
growth of the insurgency. Third, I will suggest how
events might have evolved differently if the Nepali
State and politics had been organized to give power
to district and village-level government agents (or to
regions by establishing a federal state) and to locally
elected officials who were accountable to the public.
I conclude with my central argument that excessive
centralization without democratic accountability
leads to failed government, alienated citizens, and
ultimately, to violent protest.
The period I discuss is the "democracy" period, between April1990 when a popular uprising forced the
king to allow political parties to form and compete
in elections, and October 4, 2002 when a new king
dismissed the elected government and appointed a
caretaker government. The 1990 uprising not only
led to the chance for political parties to contend for
control of the government, but also expanded civil
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rights and reduced state repression of political discourse . The
new freedoms allowed citizens to d iscuss openly the inequalities of life in Nepal, without offering them the economic and
poli tica l opportunities to improve their lives . The primary
factor clisempowering the citi zenry was the centralized system of power distribution created by the 1990 Constitution.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE STATE

Democratic Models and Ins titutional Variation
Empirical analyses describe democracies as majoritarian or
consensus (lijphart 1984, 1999). In majoritarian systems the
party with the most votes, even when it lacks a majority, gets
all or most of the power of the state. Such systems usually
have only two parties competing for control, a unitary system, and a dominant executive. The Un ited Kingdom, New
Zealand, and Botswana are examples of this model. Consensus systems, on the other hand, share povver. Power sharing
occurs when parties form coalition governments, when the
state apparatus includes two balanced Parliamentary houses,
or when the central government shares power with regional
and local elected bodies, as in federalism. The institutions
frequently associated with consensus state structures are
proportional representation, more than two dominant political parties, federa lism, and guarantees protecting minority
rights. Switzerland and Belgium are examples of consensus
systems. Many countries, such as the USA, India , Sweden ,
Norway, and Canada, combine majoritarian and consensus
institutions.
The majoritarian model can only address problems of nonplural societies in which a single clivisionsuch as class differences between workers and the rich dominates. On the other
hand, the consensus model works in societies with multiple
divisions, such as those between several ethnic groups, or between both cultural and class entit ies (lijphart 1984, 1999).
In attempts to deepen their democracies, even the prototype
majoritarian governments have begun to adopt some consensus institutions: Britain has devolved power to the regions
and ser iously considered adopting a proportional-representation electoral method. New Zealand adopted the proportional
electoral process in the mid nineties.
lijphart (1999) identifies ten political elements that distinguish these models, including the degree of centralized authority, the type of executive, the electoral system,
the cameral structure, the structure and role of th~ central
bank, the constitutiona l amendment procedure, the judicial
review process, and the roles of interest groups. In Nepal,
these political institutions are highly majoritarian and hence
they concentrate power. In fact, Nepali political institutions
are more majoritarian than those of the prototype UK and
New Zealand. 2 The consequence has been the political exclu-
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sion of socio-cultural, ideological opposition, and lower class
groups (lawoti 2002 b). l focus on the two major institutionsthat concer1trate power: the unitary state structure and the
executive.
The Unitary and Centralized State in Nepal
Nepal has a unitary state structure; this affects the power
distribution of the society in two ways . First, the unitary
structure of the state has meant that autonomous regional
governments do not exist. Second, even the minimal power
enjoyed by the districts and local governments is dependent
upon the central government, as was shown in 2001 when
the center appointed regional administrators throughout the
country. The power of the center in this unitary structure can
be better understood by contrasting it with a federal system,
in which the regional governments have a significant amount
of power guaranteed by the constitution, so the center canneither overrule the regions' decisions nor take away their
powers. Thus, regional and local governments may hold
substantial taxing authority and maintain their own police
forces. In unitary Nepal, on the other hand, the police and
civil administration are all under the control of the centra l
government.
A unitary polity can be decentralized, which means that
the center allocates to regional or local entities some of its
power. Finland, Norway, Denmark, and japan illustrate this.
However, as discussed earlier, the center can take away power
from the local governments in a unitary state,though not in a
federal state . Additionally, the federal states can provide autonomy to ethnic/cultural groups. The Nepali State is highly
centralized and has given local governments very little power
and virtually no responsibility for delivering services 3 Even
when some authority is delegated to the local governments,
such as the right to collect taxes, it is negligible. In fact, the
center's power in Nepal is further concentrated because of its
high degree of monopoly over revenue collections and distribution, making local governments dependent on the cener for
resources and aid . In arenas such as education and cu lture,
Kat hmandu has almost monopolistic power over policy formulation and implementation. For instance, the educational
curriculum for the whole country is set at the center, and
local governments have to get permission from the central
government or its line agencies to decide even small matters.
A comparative study of power distribution gives a perspective
on the Nepali case.
POWER DISTRIBUTION IN NEPAL: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE

Nepal has initiated a number of decentralization schemes
since the sixties, but the actual devolution of power is minimal (Dahal 1996). The Self Governance Act of the 2055 v.s.
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Nepal~

Degrees of Federalism and
Decentralization

Established Democracies plus

5: Federal & clecenLrahzed

Australia, Belgium (after 1993), Canada, Germany, Switzerland, US

4: Federal & centralized

Austria (4.5), India (4.5), Venezuela

3: Semi federal

Belgium (before 1993), Israel, Netherlands, Papua New Gtli.nea, Spain,

2: Unitary & decentralized

Denmark, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden

1: Unitary & centralized

Bahamas, Barbados, Botswana, Colombia, Costa Rica, France (1. 2), Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy (1.3), jamaica, Luxembourg, Malta, Mautitius, Nepal,
New Zeala11cl, Portugal, Ttinidad (1.2) , United Kingdom

Table 1. Degrees of Decentralization in 36 Democracies and Nepal (1900-2001)
Italicized countries had population less than 5,000,000 in 1995. Bold are culturally plural countries. Nepal 's rank is an average of assessments
made by me and two other Nepali decentralization experts. Source: Lijphart (1999) and Lawoti (2003 b) for Nepal.

gave more power to local governments than previous acts, but
the actual authority allowed is still tiny (NKBBS 2055 v.s).
Comparing Nepal across time does not give a useful picture;
to find out how power is distributed in Nepal, one has to
compare Nepal with other countries (Table l).
Table 1 is based on an index of power sharing devised by
Lijphart (1999). lt gives ratings of 36 democratic countries
and Nepal for intergovernmental power distribution . The
most devolved polity, ranked 5, is both federal and decentralized. The second most devolved, ranked 4, is federal but
centralized. Semi-federal systems are ranked 3, while unitary
and decentralized system rank 2. The least devolved, ranked
1, is both unitary and centralized.
Table 1 revea ls that Nepal is one of the least decentralized
countries. Despite a number of decentralization initiatives,
decentralization level remains at index l. lf there had been a
lower index, Nepal would probably have received it; index 1
group contains more decentralized polities than Nepal, such
as the UK andltaly. ln the UK, the local governments receive
substantial funding from revenue collected by the center, and
in Italy a lot of power has devolved to regional governments
(Putnam 1993).
Additionally, the unitary and centralized structure of Nepal is distinctly unable to accommodate the country's ethnic
diversity, a factor best accommodated by federal democracies (with indices of 3 to 5). ln sum, this analysis shows two
things: first , power is highly concentrated in Nepal because of
the state structure; second, the unitary state structure rnakes
achieving a desirable level of decentralization impossible.
THE HEGEMONIC EXECUTIVE

Not only does the unitary structure of the state concentrate
power, but virtually all that power is also centralized within
one institution, the executive. Only the executive, i.e., the

cabinet, is empowered to introduce legislation that affects finances (HMG Nepal1990), so the cabinet effectively controls
all legislation and its implementation. In other Parliamentary
democracies (Germany, Belgium etc.), substantial legislation
with budgetary provisions can also be introduced by members of Parliament.
Further, until 2002 no governmental entity, not even
the Commission for Investigation of Abuse and Authority
(ClAA) , could challenge or review the decisions and policies
of the cabinet. For example, when the cabinet awarded excessive amounts of money to contractors for infrastructure
projects, a practice that occurred repeatedly through all of the
administrations that ruled during the 12 "democracy" years,
the ClAA could not investigate vvhat was defined as a "policy
decision." lt is alleged that many powerful cabinet members
became rich on this provision. Another example of cabinet's
extreme power is that, in one instance in mid 1990, the cabinet withdrew an election-related murder charge against one
of its members.
The strength of the executive is enhanced because the executive either directly or indirectly controls the budgets and
personnel appointments of the other branches of government
and of "independent" constitutional commissions. Likew ise,
the executive can also influence the per formance of the judiciary, which is otherwise relatively independent , through
budgetary and personnel decisions. The role of the strong
judiciary, on the other hand, is limited in practical terms because it can only assert its power when the contesting parties
bring constitutional matters to its attention.
The royal palace might be considered a countervailing force
that cou ld constrain the power of the executive. However,
during the 12 years considered here, the royal palace did not
intervene in the daily and policy level activities of the government. lt seemed satisfied with guarding the power that the
1990 Constitution gave it, and with appointing its loyalists as
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ambassadors and members (10) to the Upper House. Palace
interventions have not directly favored the poor and underprivileged groups, except for the regular appointments of a
few dalit (traditionally considered 'low caste and untouchable'), indigenous nationalities (adibasi janajati), and women
to the Upper House.
On the other hand, if the interests of the executive and
palace are congruent, the centralization becomes even more
severe. In a later section, I argue that in cultural matters, the
state became even more hegemonic because of the common
interests of the cabinet, the royal palace, the judiciary, and
other central agencies-all of which were dominated by high
caste hill Hindu elite males.
The irony of the Nepali State, however, is that even though
it is highly centralized, it is weak and limited. The concentration of power at the center does not mean that the state is
powerful, it only means that whatever power the state possesses is concentrated at the center. As such, the state's reach
and influence in development, service delivery, administration, and security is severely limited. The state does not have
any effective presence in many sectors and regions. Even at
the center, it has failed to carry out efficiently its responsibilities, such as collecting taxes, providing security, and maintaining law and order. However, in arenas where it intersects
with local bodies and non-state agencies, the center often has
the upper hand. The consequence is that the center is powerful compared to the local and non-state agencies, but it is
absolutely weak because it has no effective presence through
much of its territory due to, among other reasons, powerless
local and district governments.
THE CENTRALIZED POLITICAL CULTURE

Powerful Parties and Dominant Leaders
The power taken away from the king in 1990 was mostly
transferred to the political parties and political leaders, not
to the people (Brown 1996). The leaders' power comes from
their actual or potential control of the executive and from their
ability to appoint their party members to positions of authority. The party leaders' powers are further enhanced because
the agencies and institutions that wield countervailing power
in most societies, groups like trade unions, professional associations, human rights groups, and civic organizations, are
either weak or under the influence of the political parties in
Nepal 5 (Bhattachan 1999 b).
The political leaders, especially the top leadership, can exercise unrestrained power, appointing syncophants to administrative posts, ignoring party rules and procedures, and often
governing on their personal whims.· The leaders nominate
at least half the central committee members, often relatives
(such as in the NC), friends, and/or caste brethrens (as in the
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CPN-UML). The appointees, in turn, remain personally loyal
to the leaders. Leaders may also appoint party candidates for
parliamentary, local, and organization elections. This centralizing political culture can eviscerate local party organi zations
and marginalize competent but more independently minded
members. Local leaders often compete to please the central
leadership, thereby further reinforcing centralization.
ETHNIC CENTRALIZATION

Many of Nepal's ethnic groups have no real access to the
state and other influential institutions in Nepal. The numbers
of dalit 6 , indigenous nationalities 7 , women, and madhesi 8 in
the influential institutions are negligible, and reduced since
the panchayat and the first parliamentary (1959-60) eras
(Lawoti 2002, Neupane 2000; NESAC 1998; Gurung 1998).
High caste Hindu elite males from the hills (Caste Hill Hindu
Elites- CHHE) overwhelmingly dominate power positions in
politics, administration, the judiciary, parliament, academia,
civil society, industry/commerce, local government, and education. jointly the CHHE and Newar 9 were 37.2 % of the
population, but in 1999 they held more than 80% of leadership positions (CHHE 66% and Newar 15%) in the important
arenas of governance (Neupane 2000).
The interesting point about this CHHE domination is that
even the relatively progressive realms such as media, civil
society, and human rights demonstrate the same absence of
minority exclusion (Neupane 2000; NESAC 1998; Gurung
1998; Onta and Parajuli 2058 v.s.; Lawoti and Yatru 2001;
Lawoti 2000a). The mainstream media dominated by the
CHHE group is often responsible for spreading stereotypes
about minorities and misrepresenting their issues (Kraemer
2003; Thapa-Magar 2000 a; Lawoti and Yatru 2001).
In sum, the centralizing state structure and centralized political culture have concentrated power in the hands of several
small ethnic/caste groups and excluded the majority of the
population from meaningful participation. No wonder then
that the lack of democratic opportunity has induced apathy
in the wider population and the explosive expansion of the
Maoist insurrection .
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CENTRALIZED POLITY

The Centralized State and the Underdevelopment of the
Periphery
One consequence of the centralized state has been the underdevelopment of the rural areas, where nearly 90 percent
of the people live. The central authorities either ignore or are
unaware of the needs of these rural residents. As noted above,
regional representatives in Parliament lack power to represent
rural aspirations effectively, and local agencies are without
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authority and resources. This neglect has created huge inequalities. For example, in 1991 life expectancy in Mugu in
remote northwestern Nepal, was 37 years; it was 7l years in
Kathmandu (Thapa 1992).
The rural regions not only suffer from inadequate programs, policies, and budget, but they have no role in planning
or implementing development projects. This centralized controlinakes it likely that projects will not fulfill the needs of
the people or produce sustainable results . Yet local elites who
are connected to the center benefit from these rare services.
For example, justice (1986: 24) found that the few health
programs provided by the center were usually located where
the local elites ·would benefit from them. These failures have
alienated rural people to the point that they are susceptible to
the Maoists' promises of radical transformation. No wonder
then that the Maoist insurgency began from the mid-west,
one of the most neglected and isolated regions in Nepal.
Another consequence of the centralization is that the central authorities, especially the cabinet members and administrators, are bogged down by minor decisions and details, such
as when central bureaucrats must decide whether distant
schools will receive tin roofs worth a few hundred dollars.
Inefficiency is further intensified because local community
leaders must go to Kathmandu and lobby these officials for
the roofs with gifts. Parliamentary representatives also must
waste their time in such lobbying.
Scholars have argued that federalism enhances economic
growth by fostering competition for investment among regions, leading to efficiency and market development (Weingast 1995; Bohora 2002). Moreover, devolution of power
to local people, as occurs in federal states, is more efficient
because locals are more familiar with the issues, needs, and
resources in the village. Finally, devolved decision-making
facilitates economic development and generates employment,
giving people a stake in the existing system and reducing
alienation among the rural people.
The Lack of Penetration of the State and its Consequences
The irony of Nepali centralization is that the state has no
reach beyond district and sub district centers. This has allowed
the Maoists to establish themselves easily in the rural areas
because no state agencies are present to resist them. When
the people saw the police and other agencies like banks and
agricultural extension services leaving rural areas because of
the }.1laoist threat, they further lost faith in the government.
Even the people who opposed the Maoist ideology did not
dare resist publicly because they realized that the state could
not guarantee their security. However, the Maoists have not
been able to take over positions where the government has
been determined to stay, such as the district headquarters.
This indicates that the growth of the Maoists is largely a con-

sequence of the absence of the state in the periphery.
The Lack of Horizontal Accountability and Power Abuse
The extreme centralization of power within the executive
has resulted in an absence of accountability. We can distinguish horizontal accountability, where the executive is accountable to independent central authorities, and vertical
accountability, where the voters hold leaders accountable during periodic elections. In democracies the constitution generally establishes state agencies, such as the election commission
and investigative commissions, to ensure fair elections and
investigate and punish misbehavior by the executive and other central agencies (O'Donnell 1999). In Nepal, however, the
election commission and the Commission for Investigation
of Abuse and Authority (CIAA) were under the influence of
the executive, so they failed in their missions. In the absence
of check and balances, a culture of power abuse pervaded
the political circle and administration, fuelling wider corruption. 10 The necessity to pay bribes for regular state services,
such as driver's licenses and passports, undermined people's
faith in the authorities and the system.
Similarly, though the ruling parties have been able to
manipulate illegally the electoral process, but the election
commission has failed to control it. These cases reduced the
legitimacy of the 1990 democracy in the eyes of the people
and alienated them from the regime. It prepared the ground
for an alternative ideology-that of the Maoists-attractive
to the alienated people. Public opinion surveys in 1999 and
2001 illustrate this alienation. In 1999 a survey showed that
ordinary people did not consider the Maoists to be one of the
top three problems faced by Nepal (Himal Association 2001;
Sharma and Sen 2056 v.s), even though the leaders, intelligentsia, and the journalists were crying themselves hoarse
against the rebels. This discrepancy indicates that the people
did not at that time disapprove of an insurgency that the elite
labeled a major enemy. 11
The growth of the Maoists in the more neglected regions
also supports the thesis that alienation is a factor in their expansion. The midwest, the hotbed of the insurgency, is one
of the most neglected regions. Likewise, politically excluded
groups like the women, indigenous nationalities, and dalit
have been found to support the insurgency in higher numbers
(Lawoti 2003).
As the central administration has ignored the needs of the
local people, the people in turn have not supported them.
This is evident in the failure of local people to inform the
government about Maoist movements and activities. In some
attacks the Maoists have gathered in hundreds or even thousands of fighters, but the administration remained unaware
of the mobilization because local people do not inform them.
Yet ordinary citizens in the district headquarters were aware
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of the imminent attacks and fl ed their houses for sa fety during the raids. The small number of local residents of distr ict
headquarters killed or injured in the attacks supports this
conclusion . 12
An administration not made up of local leaders does not
receive local support to resist the Maoist expansion. 13 Local
leaders could have pitted the major political parties against
the Maoists, hindering Maoist growth. Additionally, an administration headed by loca l leaders could have avoided many
of the unnecessarily repressive acts of the government, which
pushed people in the middle into the insurgency.
Centralization and Civil Strife
Empirical studies covering a large number of countries
have demonstrated that unitary and centralized states are
prone to rebellions, whereas federal countries are prone to
conflicts of less severity, such as protests (Cohen 1997; Sa ideman et al. 2002). The reason for the different outcomes is
that federalism, with multiple levels of governments, creates
multiple power centers that dissatisfied and mobilized groups
can access to attain their goals. Access allow groups to air
and sometimes resolve their grievances, thereby preventing
dissatisfaction from escalating into rebellion. Unitary states,
on the other hand, provide few points at which the people
can express their grievances, which may deepen and sometimes turn into rebellion . The peoples' grievances in Nepal
were many and were seldom addressed because, among other
things, the people had no place to go to complain. In such
circumstances, the Maoists who promised to work for the
welfare of the poor and marginalized people, attracted those
who felt excluded by the state .
Likew ise, scholars have found that consensus (proportional) electoral systems help to manage conflicts, whereas
the majoritarian (first-past-the-post) systems, which have
been used for parliamentary and local elections in Nepal, are
significantly associated vvith violent conflicts (Powell 1981;
Cohen 1997; Saideman et al. 2002). The majoritarian system
facilitates conflicts in culturally plural societies for two reasons. First, they promote concentration of power by giving the
larger parties more seats than are proportional to their vote
totals, as we saw in Nepal's last three elections. Second, they
undermine smaller parties by providing no seats in Parliament to parties with notable vote totals. In the 1999 general
elections CPN-ML and RPP-C did not get a singl.e seat in the
Lower House even though they had rece ived 6 percep.t and 3
percent of votes respectively.
In Nepal, the centralized polity worked to fuel rebellion in
other ways as well. Prior to the initiation of the insurgency in
1996, the Nepali Congress gove rnment jailed and tortured
the activists and leaders of the Maoist poiitical party (United
People's Front Nepal, UPFN), in their stronghold of Rolpa and
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Rukum, including the elected official of the district development committees.14 The power abuse by the central authority; which controls the police and administration, though
designed to help the NC, helped to push the Maoists into
the insurgency (INSEC 1999; Prachanda 1999). This repression could take place because of the unitary and centralized
structure of the state. If there had been regional governments
or if the police force had been under the district governments,
the extensive one-way abuse of power by the center would
not have been possible. After all, the Maoists controlled the
district government in Rolpa while the NC controlled the center. Without this state repression, the insurgency might have
been avoided.
Non-Power Sharing Attitude and Absence of Compromises
The desire to confine power within one's party or faction
has led to many opportunities being squandered, at both
the national level and within the parties. For instance, the
Deuba government of the NC thought that the situation had
deteriorated enough to declare the state emergency in 2001,
but did not choose to form an all-party national government
to face the crises. In countries around the world, emergency
cabinets are often formed in times of crises (Lijphart 1999).
In Nepal, the CPN-UML leaders, as communists, would have
been useful cabinet partners for tackling the Maoists because
they understand better the strategies, tools, and psyche of the
Maoists leaders and cadres. This knowledge might have been
more effective to counter the Maoists in their initial stages of
growth. Likewise, the lack of inclusion of the other political parties in the dialogue with the Maoists and the lack of
consultation with them in the declaration of the emergency
indicates the government's unwillingness to share power and
authority. This attitude was also apparent earlier in the formation of a committee to study the Maoist problem by the Bhattarai government. It consisted only of the NC members.
The lack of a coherent strategy by the state and political
parties for the Maoists can be attributed to the non-power
sharing attitude as well. The parties have spent most of their
time, energy, and resources since 1996 attempting to form
governments dominated by their own party or faction rather
than cooperating with other parties to govern the country.
This has resulted into extreme instability during both the
hung parliaments of thel994-1999 period and the majority
Parliament after 1999. The parties were often more intent on
using the Maoists for their own partisan purposes than they
were on forming coalitions to implement a coherent strategy
against the Maoists.
This same distrust has blocked the political parties from
forming all-party coalitions in the districts and villages to
counter the Maoists. 15 Yet cooperative attitudes and readiness to compromise could have also sent positive signals to
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the Maoists that a power-sharing cu lture had developed . lt
might have shown the Maoists that they had a better chance
of sharing power if they were to join the mainstream electoral
politics.
Ethnic Centra lization and Minority Participation in the
Insurgency
E\,en though the state is weak in terms of development and
in providing services and security, it has affected the society very deeply with its social and
cultural policy of assimilation, homogenization, and mono-cultural
nationalism. These policies seek to
impose the values and norms of the
dominant group on the society as a
whole. 16 The state has promoted
one language (Khas-Nepali), one
religion (Hindu), one culture (hill
'high caste' male), and one dress .
lts impact on marginalized groups
has been devastating. Many languages face extinction, and many
groups have lost land and culture.
The monopoly of the electronic
media and education policy has
played a very significant role in the
assimilation process, because radio
reaches every nook and cranny of
the country, and education policy
affects everyone who goes to school. After 1990, radio programs in some of the other major languages were begun, but
Yatru (2058 v.s) found in 2001 that programs featuring the l4
major ethnic languages were only 7.84% of the total broadcast time, while Khas-Nepali alone accounted for nearly 90
percent; the remaining time was allocated to broadcasts in
English, Hindi, and Urdu. Similarly, although some explicitly
prejudicial discussions of minorities in the textbooks were
dropped after the minorities protested, the books are still imbued with dominant group values. For instance, most of the
heroes discussed in the social studies and Nepali texts are
from the dominant group (Lawoti 2000a).
Even though these policies reached their peak during the
Panchayat period, they continue today. This is largely because
of the ethnic centralization of the state. The decision-making processes have no significant representation by mir:torities. Hence, minority perspectives, interests, and needs are
not well represented or included in government policies. The
resulting discrimination and the lack of social reforms have
alienated the minorities. lt is important to note that although
the political parties and factions may be in political/ideological conflicts, they all converge in the accepting and promoting

the hill Hindu religious ideology.
Davidheiser (1992) argues that strong state policies have
destabilizing impact in the society and may contribute to
revolutions. ln Nepal, these cultural and social policies often
destabilized the minority societies by uprooting them, margina lizing their cultures, alienating them from their ancestral
lands, and undermining their communal stability. The destabilization has produced a large population of fluid minorities.
They are attracted to the Maoists who have promised them
voice, recognition, rights, space,
and dignity in their 'new regime.'
The Maoists have raised the issues of self-determination, cultural and regional autonomy, and
linguistic, religious, and gender
equality more vociferously than
other mainstream political parties.
They have formed many ethnic liberation fronts. These strategies have
been more attractive to the minorities facing cu ltural and communal
destabilization as a result of state
policies, as demonstrated by a high
participation of the indigenous nationalities, dalit, and women in the
insurgency (Lawoti 2003).
CONCLUSION

l have argued in this paper that the centralized polity has
contributed in the growth of the Maoist insurgency. The further danger of the centra lized polity is that it may facilitate
the growth of other types of violence , such as inter-ethnic
conflicts. Riots between cultural and ethnic groups (Hill
groups versus Tarai lowlanders, Hindus versus Muslims, and
indigenous nationalities insurgency) have already taken place.
The conflicts might grow if the issues producing them are not
addressed (Bhattachan 2000a; Lawoti forthcoming).
This study argues that the dramatic growth of the Maoists has been fostered by the weakness of the state, not solely
because of the organization, mobilization, and strength of
the Maoists. This suggests that if the state capacity increases,
as the security sector seems to have strengthened since mid
2003, the Maoists would face greater difficulties in attacking
security posts in the future . Hovvever, it does not mean that
the Maoists can be wiped out. Furthermore, a military solution is not a viable long-term option for the country because
of the high economic and socio-political costs.
How can the problems of over centralization then be addressed? The solution is to diffuse power so that different
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political and socio-cultural groups can access it. When different groups access power, they will no longer have need
to rely on violent means. This calls for reforms in the state
structured composition of political culture. The state should
be decentralized, political culture made egalitarian, and the
state positions of power be open equally to all cultural and
ethnic groups. First, the unitary state has to be replaced by a
federal one to provide cultural autonomy, enhance decentralization, and promote economic development. Second, democratization of political parties will draw the disaffected into the
political process. Democracy within the parties will ensure
more accountability among political leaders and give voice
and space to political activists. For instance, if the local political parties were to elect candidates for public offices such
as Parliament through party grassroots cadres' voting, then
the cadres' voices and influence may increase within political
parties. Third, proportional electoral system can distribute
resources (seats in elections) more judiciously. Affirmative
action and policies to address historical discrimination and
minority group concerns will also facilitate egalitarian distribution of resources.
No single remedy will work in Nepal because the problems
are deep and wide. My recommendations will not control the
Maoists insurgency immediately. In the short run, a settlement
between the insurgents and the state is essential. However, a
mere settlement is not enough to prevent violent conflicts in
the future. Widespread structural, attitudinal, and cultural
reforms are warranted to guide the country toward a more
egalitarian path. As the society moves toward a more egalitarian structure, the rationale for violent conflicts will lessen.
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ENDNOTES
1

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference
on the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, 31st Annual South Asia Conference, University of Wisconsin at Madison, October 10, 2002. I
would like to thank john Metz for excellent feed back and editorial
assistance and Mary Des Chene, Susan Hangen, and the participants of the conference for feedback.
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2

The judicial review and constitutional rigidity appear to ensure power sharing but if we analyze their broader role we ·see that
they promote rnajoritarianism. For instance, because of ri gidity in
amending th e Constitution it is difficult to reform th e political institutions that perpetuate the domination of the dominant group.
Likewise, since the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution,
judicial review depends largely on a Constitution that has concenlt'ated power in the executive and discriminates against minorities.
3

One distinction between unitary centra li zed and decentralized polities is that in the former taxes are collected and spent by
the center's agencies, \-vhile in the latter taxes may still be collected
largely by the center but are returned substantia ll y to local governments for delivering services.
4

These countries remained democracies uninterrupted for more
than 19 years, and the Freedom House rated them as 'free' (Lijphart
1999)
5

These organizations and mediums have grown considerably
since 1990 but still have far less influences compared to similar
organizations in other countries. One reason for their less influence
is their lack of independence.
6

Dalit means "the oppressed." It is the name reform leaders of
"untouchable" groups have adopted to identify their groups.
7

"Indigenous groups" refers to Tibeto -Burman groups who
had settled Nepal before the expansion of caste Hindus into the
mountains from India. These groups had more egalita rian social
systems.
8

"Madheshi " refers to people from Nepal's Tarai, the region in
the extreme south that is the northern edge of the Gangetic plain.
Madheshi have culture and languages similar to north India and
they are distinct from the mountainous "Hills" of Nepal.

ticated , caste-based feudal society. They were conquered by caste
Hindus in the late 18th century expansion that created modern Nepal. Newar elites and merchants retained considerable power and
share in positions of authority.

°

1

Corruption charges against the NC ministers were finally
lodged in October 2002 but till then corruption had spread widely
and consequent disillusionment and public apathy had grown to
substantial levels.
11

A more recent opinion poll (Nepali Times 2002) has shown
that the people have begun to blame the Maoists for the current
crises in the country. This attitude change has come after the Maoists began widespread destruction of development infrastructure,
such as schools, health posts, telephone transmission towers, and
Village Development Center (VDC) offices. In October 2003 Prachanda, the supreme Maoist leader, issued a statement saying that
the politburo meeting of the party has decided to stop the destruction of development infrastructures. As of the writing of this paper,
however, it had not stopped.
12

Even if we assume that the people may not have supplied information to the administration because of the Maoist threat, the fear
of the Maoists even in the district headquarters is an indication of
the state's failure to provide security under its very nose.
13

Newspapers have published complaints of senior security personnel on the lack of popular support toward the fight against the
insurgency.
14

In Rolpa, where the insurgency began, the NC and the Maoists were political competitors, leading to frequent conflicts between
them (INSEC 1999).
15

See Ryan (1994) for the consequences of coalition formations
for revolutionary movements.
16

9

Please see Lawoti (2000, 2002, especially chapter 4), Subba et
a!. (2000), FWLD (2000) for other examples of cu ltural discrimination.
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The Newar are a Tibeto-Burman group who settled the Kathmandu basin more than 2,000 years ago and established a sophis-

